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Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a new class of game dynamics made of a pay-off replicator-like
term modulated by an entropy barrier which keeps players away from the boundary of the strategy space.
We show that these entropy-driven dynamics are equivalent to players computing a score as their on-going
exponentially discounted cumulative payoff and then using a quantal choice model on the scores to pick an
action. This dual perspective on entropy-driven dynamics helps us to extend the folk theorem on conver-
gence to quantal response equilibria to this case, for potential games. It also provides the main ingredients
to design a discrete time effective learning algorithm that is fully distributed and only requires partial infor-
mation to converge to QRE. This convergence is resilient to stochastic perturbations and observation errors
and does not require any synchronization between the players.
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Dynamiques de jeux avec un terme d’entropie et leurs propriétés de
résilience
Résumé : Dans cet article, nous introduisons une nouvelle classe de dynamiques de jeux avec un terme
de gain, de type réplication, modulé par une barrière entropique qui permet de maintenir les stratégies des
joueurs loin des frontières du domaine. Nous montrons que ces dynamiques qui ont un terme d’entropie
peuvent aussi être obtenues par des joueurs qui maintiennent un score sous la forme de leur gain cumulé
actualisé et qui sélectionnent leurs actions sous la forme d’une réponse quantifiée à leur score courant.
Cette double vision de la dynamique permet d’établir le théorème fondamental de convergence vers les
points fixes de la réponse quantifié (qui sont proches des équilibres de Nash), dans le cas des jeux de
potentiel. Elle permet aussi de mettre au point un algorithme discret effectif, complètement décentralisé
et qui n’utilise que les données locales accessibles à chaque joueur, pour converger vers les points fixes
de la dynamique. Cette convergence est conservée en présence de perturbations aléatoires et d’erreurs de
mesure et ne nécessite pas de synchronisation entre les joueurs.
Mots-clés : Apprentissage par renforcement, approximation stochastique, équilibres de réponse quanti-
tative, entropie
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1 Introduction.
Owing to the computational complexity of Nash equilibria and related game-theoretic solution concepts,
algorithms and processes for learning in games have received considerable attention over the last two
decades. Such procedures can be divided into two broad categories, depending on whether they evolve in
continuous or discrete time: the former class includes the numerous dynamics for learning and evolution
(see e.g. Sandholm [28] for a recent survey), whereas the latter focuses on learning in infinitely iterated
games, such as fictitious play and its variants – for an overview, see Fudenberg and Levine [11] and
references therein.
A key challenge in these endeavors is that it is often unreasonable to assume that players are capable
of monitoring the strategies of their opponents – or even of calculating the payoffs of actions that they did
not play. As a result, much of the literature of learning in games revolves around payoff-based adaptive
schemes which only require players to observe the stream of their in-game payoffs: for instance, in
the framework of cumulative reinforcement learning, players use their observed payoff information to
score their actions based on their estimated performance over time, and they then use a fixed decision
model (such as logit choice) to determine their actions at the next instance of play. The convergence of
such algorithms in 2-player games has been studied from a Q-learning perspective by Leslie and Collins
[18] and Tuyls et al. [32] whereas, more recently, Cominetti et al. [10] and Bravo [9] took a moving-
average approach for scoring actions in general N -player games and studied the long-term behavior of the
resulting dynamics. Interestingly, in all these cases, when the learning process converges, it converges to a
perturbed Nash equilibrium of the game – viz. a fixed point of a perturbed best-response correspondence
(Fudenberg and Levine [11]).
Stochastic processes of this kind are usually analyzed with the ODE method of stochastic approxima-
tion which essentially compares the long-term behavior of the discrete-time process to the corresponding
mean-field dynamics in continuous time – see e.g. the surveys by Benaïm [5] and Borkar [8]. Indeed,
there are several sufficient conditions which guarantee that a discrete-time process and its continuous
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counterpart both converge asymptotically to the same sets, so the continuous dynamics are usually de-
rived as a limit of a discrete-time (and possibly random) process rooted in some adaptive learning scheme
– cf. the aforementioned works by Leslie and Collins [18], Cominetti et al. [10], and Bravo [9].
Contrary to this approach, we proceed from the continuous to the discrete and develop two different
learning processes from the same dynamical system (the actual algorithm depends crucially on whether
we look at the evolution of the players’ strategies or the performance scores of their actions). Accordingly,
the first contribution of our paper is to derive a class of entropy-driven game dynamics which consist
of a replicator-like term plus a barrier term that keeps players from approaching the boundary of the
state space by imposing an entropic penalty to their payoffs – hence the dynamics’ name. Interestingly,
these dynamics are equivalent to players scoring their actions by taking an exponentially discounted (and
continuously updated) aggregate of their payoffs and then using a quantal choice model to pick an action
(McKelvey and Palfrey [21]); as such, entropy-driven dynamics constitute the strategy-space counterpart
of the Q-learning dynamics of Leslie and Collins [18] – see also Tuyls et al. [32].
Another important feature of these dynamics is their temperature, a parameter which specifies the
relative weight of the dynamics’ entropic barrier term with respect to the game’s payoffs – and also mea-
sures the weight that players attribute to past events, viz. the discount factor of their payoff aggregation
scheme. These considerations allow us to derive a number of quite general results such as the dynamics’
convergence to quantal response equilibria (QRE) in potential games and an extension of the well-known
folk theorem of evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund [13]). In particular, we show that sta-
bility and convergence depend crucially on the temperature of the dynamics: at zero temperature, strict
Nash equilibria are the only stable and attracting states of the dynamics, just as in the case of the replicator
equation; for negative temperatures, all pure action profiles are attracting (but with vastly different basins
of attraction), whereas for low positive temperatures, only QRE that are close to strict equilibria remain
asymptotically stable.
The second important contribution of our paper concerns the practical implementation of entropy-
driven game dynamics as learning algorithms with the following desirable properties:
1. The learning proceducre is payoff-based, fully distributed and stateless – players only need to
observe their in-game payoffs and no knowledge of the game’s structure or of the algorithm’s state
is required.
2. Payoffs may be subject to stochastic perturbations and observation errors; in fact, payoff observa-
tions need not even be up-to-date.
3. Updates need not be synchronized – there is no need for a global, centralized update clock used by
all players.
These properties are key for the design of robust, decentralized optimization protocols in network and traf-
fic engineering, but they also pose significant obstacles to convergence. Be that as it may, the convergence
and boundary-avoidance properties of the continuous-time dynamics allow us to show that players con-
verge to arbitrarily precise quantal approximations of strict Nash equilibria in potential games (Theorem
15 and Propositions 16, 17). Thus, thanks to the congestion characterization of such games (Monderer
and Shapley [24]), we obtain a powerful distributed optimization method for a wide class of engineering
problems, ranging from traffic routing (Altman et al. [1]) to wireless communications (Mertikopoulos
et al. [22]).
1.1 Paper outline and structure.
After a few preliminaries in the rest of this section, our analysis proper begins in Section 2 where we
introduce our cumulative reinforcement learning scheme and derive the associated entropy-driven game
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dynamics. Owing to the duality between the evolution of the players’ mixed strategies and the perfor-
mance scores of their actions (measured by an exponentially discounted aggregate of past payofs), we
obtain two equivalent formulations of the dynamics: the score-based integral equation (ERL) and the
strategy-based dynamics (ED).
In Section ??, we exploit this interplay to derive certain properties of the entropy-driven game dy-
namics, namely their convergence to perturbed equilibria in potential games (Proposition 7), and a vari-
ant of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory (Theorem 10). Finally, Section 4 is devoted to
the discretization of the dynamics (ERL) and (ED), yielding Algorithms 1 and 2 respectively. By using
stochastic approximation techniques, we show that when the players’ learning temperature is positive
(corresponding to an exponential discount factor λ < 1), then the strategy-based algorithm converges
almost surely to perturbed strict equilibria in potential games (Theorem 15), even in the presence of noise
(Proposition 16) and/or update asynchronicities (Proposition 17).
1.2 Notational conventions.
If S = {sα }nα=0 is a finite set, the vector space spanned by S over R will be the set R
S of all maps
x : S → R, s ∈ S 7→ xs ∈ R. The canonical basis {es }s∈S of this space consists of the indicator
functions es : S → R which take the value es(s) = 1 on s and vanish otherwise, so thanks to the natural
identification s 7→ es , we will make no distinction between s ∈ S and the corresponding basis vector es
of RS. Likewise, to avoid drowning in a morass of indices, we will frequently use the index α to refer
interchangeably to either sα or eα (writing e.g. xα instead of the more unwieldy xsα ); in a similar vein,
if {Sk }k∈K is a finite family of finite sets indexed by k ∈ K, we will use the shorthands (α;α−k ) for the




α in place of
∑
α∈Sk .
We will also identify the set ∆(S) of probability measures on S with the unit n-dimensional simplex
∆(S) ≡ {x ∈ RS :
∑
α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0} of RS. Since ∆(S) is a smooth submanifold-with-corners of
RS, by a smooth function on ∆(S) we will mean a C∞ function in the smooth structure that ∆(S) inherits
from RS (Lee [17]). Moreover, if S0 ≡ S \ {s0}, we will write proj0(x) ≡ x−0 = (x1 , . . . , xn) for the
induced surjection x ∈ RS 7→ x |S0 ∈ R
S0 .
Regarding players and their actions, we will follow the original convention of Nash and employ Latin
indices (k , `, . . . ) for players, while keeping Greek ones (α, β, . . . ) for their actions (pure strategies);
finally, unless otherwise mentioned, we will use α, β, . . . , for indices that start at 0, and µ, ν, . . . , for
those which start at 1.
1.3 Definitions from game theory.
A finite gameG ≡ G(N,A, u) will be a tuple consisting of a) a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , N }; b) a
finite set Ak of actions (or pure strategies) for each player k ∈ N; and c) the players’ payoff functions
uk : A → R, where A ≡
∏
k Ak denotes the game’s action space, i.e. the set of all action profiles
(α1 , . . . , αN ), αk ∈ Ak . More succinctly, if A∗ ≡
∐
k Ak = {(α, k) : α ∈ Ak } is the disjoint union of






the profile (α1 , . . . , αN ) ∈ A to the payoff vector (uk (α;α−k ))α∈Ak ,k∈N ∈
∏
k R
Ak . A restriction of
G will then be a game G′ ≡ G′(N,A′ , u′) with the same players as G, each with a subset A′
k
⊆ Ak of
their original actions, and with payoff functions u′
k







Of course, players can mix their actions by taking probability distributions xk = (xkα)α∈Ak ∈ ∆(Ak )







uk (α1 , . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · · xN,αN , (1)
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where x = (x1 , . . . , xN ) denotes the players’ (mixed) strategy profile and uk (α1 , . . . , αN ) is the payoff to
player k in the (pure) action profile (α1 , . . . , αN ) ∈ A;1 more explicitly, if player k plays the pure strategy
α ∈ Ak , we will use the notation ukα(x) ≡ uk (α; x−k ) = uk (x1 , . . . , α, . . . , xN ). In this mixed context,
the strategy space of player k will be the simplex Xk ≡ ∆(Ak ) while the strategy space of the game will
be the convex polytope X ≡
∏
k Xk . Together with the players’ (expected) payoff functions uk : X → R,
the tuple (N, X , u) will be called the mixed extension of G and it will also be denoted by G (relying on
context to resolve any ambiguities).
The most prominent solution concept in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium (NE) which char-
acterizes profiles that are resilient against unilateral deviations. We will thus say that q ∈ X is a Nash
equilibrium ofG when
uk (xk ; q−k ) ≤ uk (q) for all xk ∈ Xk and for all k ∈ N. (NE)
In particular, if (NE) is strict for all xk ∈ Xk \ {qk }, k ∈ N, then q will be called a strict Nash equilibrium.
An especially relevant class of finite games is obtained when the players’ payoff functions satisfy the
potential property :
ukα(x) − ukβ(x) = U(α; x−k ) −U(β; x−k ) (2)
for some (necessarily) multilinear function U : X → R. When this is the case, the game will be called
a potential game with potential function U , and as is well known, the pure Nash equilibria of G will be
precisely the vertices of X that are local maximizers ofU (Monderer and Shapley [24]).
2 Reinforcement learning and entropy-driven dynamics.
In this section, our aim will be to derive a class of continuous-time learning dynamics based on the
following cumulative reinforcement premise: agents accumulate a long-term “performance score” for
each of their actions and they then use a smooth choice function to map these scores to strategies and
continue playing. More precisely:
1. The assessment phase (Section 2.2) will comprise the scheme with which players aggregate past
payoff information in order to update their actions’ performance scores.
2. The choice phase (Section 2.3) will then describe how these scores are used to select a mixed
strategy.
For simplicity, we will first derive the dynamics that correspond to this learning process in the case
of a single player whose payoffs are determined at each instance of play by Nature—the case of several
players involved in a finite game will be entirely similar. Furthermore, the passage from discrete to
continuous time will be done here at a heuristic level and we will assume that players have perfect payoff
information, that is: a) they are assumed able to observe or otherwise calculate the payoffs of all their
actions; and b) unless mentioned otherwise, this payoff information will be assumed accurate and not
subject to measurement errors or other exogenous perturbations. The precise interplay between discrete
and continuous time and the effect of imperfect information and stochastic fluctuations will be explored
in detail in Section 4.
1Recall that we will be using α for both elements α ∈ Ak and basis vectors eα ∈ ∆(Ak ), so there is no clash of notation
between payoffs to pure and mixed strategies.
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2.1 The model.
In view of the above, our single-player learning model will be as follows: at time t , an agent makes a
discrete choice from the elements of a finite set A = {α0 , α1 , . . . , αn } (representing e.g. the routes of
a traffic network, different stock options, etc.). We will denote the payoff to α ∈ A at time t by uα(t),
and the agent’s assessment of his actions’ performance up to instance t will be represented by the score
variables yα(t) ∈ R, α ∈ A. In this context, the assessment phase will describe how yα(t) is updated
using the payoffs uα(s), s ≤ t, of all past instances of play, whereas the choice stage will specify the
choice map Q : RA → X ≡ ∆(A) which prescribes the agent’s mixed strategy x ∈ X given his assessment
of each action α ∈ A so far.
2.2 The assessment stage: memory and aggregation of past information.
Assuming for the moment that the agent plays at discrete time intervals s = 0, 1, . . . , t , the class of






where λ ∈ (0,+∞) is the model’s discounting parameter, uα(t) is the sequence of payoffs corresponding
to α ∈ A, and we are assuming for the moment that the model is initially unbiased, i.e. yα(0) = 0.
Clearly:
1. For λ ∈ (0, 1) we get the standard exponential discounting model which assigns exponentially more
weight to recent observations.
2. If λ = 1 we get the unweighted aggregation scheme yα(t) =
∑t
s=1 uα(t) which has been examined
in the context of learning by Rustichini [27], Hofbauer et al. [14], Sorin [30], Mertikopoulos and
Moustakas [23] and many others.
3. For λ > 1, the scheme (3) assigns exponentially more weight to past instances; as such, this
case has attracted very little interest in the literature (after all, it seems rather counter-intuitive to
discount current events in favor of a possibly irrelevant past). Nevertheless, we will see that the
choice λ > 1 leads to some very surprising advantages, so we will not exclude this parameter range
from our analysis.
Now, if the agent plays at discrete time intervals 0, h, . . . , nh ≡ t with time step h > 0, the exponential





where the factor h has been included to make the sum (3′) intensive in h,2 the notation [0 : t : h]
represents the index set {0, h, 2h, . . . , nh = t }, and we plead guilty to a slight abuse of notation for not
differentiating between s and s/h in the argument of uα (and between n and t = nh in the case of yα).
Accordingly, the assessment scheme (3′) yields the recursive updating rule:
yα(t) = uα(t)h + λhyα(t − h), (4)
which in turn shows that the updating of (3′) does not require the agent to have infinite memory: scores
are simply updated by adding the payoffs obtained over a period h to the scores of the previous period
scaled by the discount (or reinforcement) factor λh .
2Note that the sum (3′) consists of O(1/h) terms that are O(1) in h so it would scale extensively with h−1 if not scaled by h.
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In this way, letting h → 0+ (and assuming Lipschitz-continuous payoff processes uα(t) for simplicity),
we readily obtain the continuous-time model
ẏα(t) = uα(t) − Tyα(t), (5)
or, in integral form:
yα(t) = yα(0)e−Tt +
∫ t
0
e−T (t−s)uα(s) ds, (5′)
where
T ≡ log(1/λ) (6)
represents the temperature of our performance assessment scheme (see the following sections for a jus-
tification of this terminology) and the term yα(0)e−Tt reflects the initial bias yα(0) of the agent (initially
taken equal to 0).3 In tune with our previous discussion, the standard exponential discounting regime
λ ∈ (0, 1) will thus correspond to positive temperatures T > 0, unweighted aggregation will be ob-
tained for T → 0, and exponential reinforcing of past observations will be recovered for negative learning
temperatures T < 0.
Remark 1. In our context, the scheme (5) emerges quite simply as the differential form of an exponetially
discounted model for aggregating past payoffs. It is thus interesting to note that Leslie and Collins [18]
and Tuyls et al. [32] obtained the dynamics (5) for T = 1 from a quite different viewpoint, namely as the
continuous-time limit of the Q-learning estimator




where 1 and P denote respectively the indicator and probability of having chosen α at time t , and γ(t)
is an (`2 − `1)-summable series of time steps (see also Fudenberg and Levine [11]). The exact interplay
between (5) and (7) will be explored in detail in Section 4; for now we simply note that (5) can be
interpreted both a model of discounting past information and also as a moving Q-average.
While on this point, we should also highlight the relation between (7) and the moving average es-
timator of Cominetti et al. [10] which omits the factor P(α(t) = α) (or the similar estimator of Bravo
[9] which has a state-dependent step size). As a result of this difference, the mean-field dynamics of
[10] are scaled by the player’s mixed strategy xα(t) = P(α(t) = α), leading to the adjusted dynamics
ẏα = xα(t) (uα(t) − yα(t)). Given this difference in form, there will basically be no overlap between
our results and those of Cominetti et al. [10], but we will endeavor to draw analogies with their results
wherever possible.
2.3 The choice stage: smoothed best responses and entropy functions.
Having established the way that an agent updates his assessment vector y ∈ RA over time, we now turn
to mapping these scores to mixed strategies x ∈ X ≡ ∆(A) in a smooth fashion. In the theory of discrete
choice, this boils down to a smooth best response problem so our aim will be to give a brief overview
of the related constructions suitably adapted to our purposes; for a more comprehensive account, see
McFadden [20], Anderson et al. [3], or Chapter 5 in Sandholm [28].
To motivate our approach, observe that a natural choice for the agent would be to always pick the
action α ∈ A with the highest score; however, this “best response” approach carries several problems:
First, if two scores yα and yβ happen to be equal (e.g. if there are payoff ties), then this mapping becomes
a set-valued correspondence which requires a tie-breaking rule to be resolved (and is theoretically quite
3Note that the difference/differential equations (4)/(5) imply that initial scores decay (or grow) exponentially with time in the
absence of external forcing, commensurately to the first payoff observation uα (0).
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cumbersome to boot). Additionally, such a practice could lead to completely discontinuous trajectories of
play in continuous time—for instance, when the payoffs uα(t) are driven by an additive white Gaussian
noise process, as is commonly the case in information-theoretic applications of game theory; see e.g.
Altman et al. [1]. Finally, since best responding generically results in picking pure strategies, such a
process precludes convergence of strategies to non-pure equilibria in finite games.
In view of the above, a common alternative to the “best response” choice x = arg maxα∈A{yα } is to




, α ∈ A (8)
(see e.g. Cominetti et al. [10], Fudenberg and Levine [11], Hofbauer et al. [14], Leslie and Collins [18],
Marsili et al. [19], Mertikopoulos and Moustakas [23], Rustichini [27], Sorin [30] and many others for
uses of this choice map in game-theoretic learning). Indeed, it is well-known that G(y) is the unique
solution of the (strictly concave) maximization problem
maximize
∑
β xβyβ − g(x),
subject to xα ≥ 0,
∑
β xβ = 1,
(9)
where the Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy g(x) =
∑
β xβ log xβ acts as a control cost adjustment to the agent’s
average score y =
∑
β xβyβ (Fudenberg and Levine [11], van Damme [33]). In this way, G(y) can
be viewed as a smoothed best response : if the control cost is scaled down by some small ε > 0 (i.e.
g(x) is replaced by εg(x) in (9)), then the resulting solution xε = G(ε−1y) of (9) represents a smooth
approximation to the best response correspondence y 7→ arg maxα∈A{yα } as ε → 0.
Interestingly, the Gibbs map can also be seen as a special case of a quantal response function in
the sense of McKelvey and Palfrey [21]—or a perturbed best response in the language of Hofbauer and
Sandholm [12]. To wit, assume that the agents’ scores are subject to additive stochastic fluctuations of
the form
ỹα = yα + ξα , (10)
where the ξα are independently Gumbel-distributed random variables with zero mean and scale parameter
ε > 0 (amounting to a variance of ε2π2/6). Then, the choice probability Pα(y) of α ∈ A (defined as the
probability that α ∈ A maximizes the perturbed score variable ỹα) will simply be
Pα(y) ≡ P
(
ỹα = maxβ ỹβ
)
= Gα(ε−1y). (11)
As a result, ordinary best responses are again recovered in the limit where the magnitude of the perturba-
tions (measured by the scale parameter ε > 0 of the Gumbel distribution) approaches 0.
More generally, assume that the perturbations ξα are not Gumbel-distributed but instead follow an
arbitrary probability law with a strictly positive and smooth density function. In this context, Hofbauer




β xβyβ − h(x),
subject to xα ≥ 0,
∑
β xβ = 1,
(EP)
where the deterministic representation h of ξ h is a smooth, strictly convex function on X ≡ ∆(A).
Specifically, the choice probabilities Qα(y) ≡ P(ỹα = maxβ ỹβ) determine a strictly convex potential
4Due to the entrenched terminology for the logit choice model, many authors call (8) the “logit” map. However, (8) actually
describes the inverse logit (or logistic) distribution, so, to avoid inconsistencies, we will refer to (8) by the name of its originator.
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function h∗ : RA → R such that Qα(y) = ∂h
∗
∂yα
, so h∗ will be related to the deterministic representation h
of ξ via the Legendre-Fenchel transformation (Rockafellar [26]):
h∗(y) = maxx∈X
{∑
β xβyβ − h(x)
}
, y ∈ RA. (L-F)
On account of the above, the choice map Q can be viewed either as a quantal response function to
some perturbation process ξ , or as a smooth approximation to arg maxα yα with respect to an admissible
control cost adjustment h (if we take the strictly concave problem (EP) as our starting point).5 Formally,
we have:
Definition 1. A function h : X → R ∪ {+∞} will be called a generalized entropy function when:
1. h is convex and finite almost everywhere, except possibly on the relative boundary bd(X) of X .
2. h is smooth on rel int(X) and |dh(x)| → ∞ when x converges to bd(X).
3. The Hessian tensor Hess(h) of h is positive-definite on rel int(X).
The Legendre-Fenchel conjugate h∗ of h as defined by (L-F) will be called the free entropy of h, and the
map Q : RA → X , y 7→ Q(y) ≡ arg maxx∈X {
∑
β xβyβ − h(x)}, will be the choice map associated to h.
Finally, a generalized entropy function h : X → R will be called regular when a) its restriction to any
subface X ′ of X is itself an entropy function, and b) the ratio h′(q + vt)/h′′(q + vt) vanishes as q + vt
approaches bd(X ′) for all interior points q ∈ rel int(X ′) and for all tangent vectors v ∈ TqX ′.
The fact that the choice map Q of an entropy functional is well-defined and single-valued is an easy
consequence of the convexity and boundary behavior of h; the smoothness of Q then follows from the
implicit function theorem. Thus, given that (EP) allows us to view Q(ε−1y) as a smooth approximation
to arg maxα yα for ε → 0+, the class of choice maps that we will consider will be precisely the maps that
are derived from entropy functionals in the sense of Definition 1. A few remarks are thus in order:
Remark 1. In statistical mechanics and information theory, entropy functions are concave, so Definition
1 actually describes negative entropies. Besides notational convenience, one of the main reasons for this
change of sign is that entropy functions as defined above are essentially smooth functions of Legendre
type, with the added non-degeneracy condition of having a strictly definite Hessian (Rockafellar [26]). In
fact, Definition 1 with our chosen sign convention bears very close ties to the class of Bregman functions,
a key tool in interior point and proximal methods in optimization; for a more detailed account, see e.g.
Rockafellar [26], Auslender et al. [4], Alvarez et al. [2] and references therein.
Remark 2. Examples of entropy functionals abound; some of the most prominent ones are:
1. The Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy: h(x) =
∑
β xβ log xβ . (12a)
2. The log-entropy: h(x) = −
∑
β log xβ . (12b)




β ), 0 < q ≤ 1. (12c)




β , 0 < q ≤ 1. (12d)
Except for the Rényi entropy, all of the above examples can be written in the convenient form h(x) =∑
β θ(xβ) for some function θ : [0,+∞)→ R ∪ {+∞} with the properties:
5These two viewpoints are not equivalent because there exist cost functions h that do not arise as deterministic representations of
perturbation processes ξ—see Hofbauer and Sandholm [12] for a counterexample based on the log-entropy h(x) = −
∑
β log xβ .
6The Tsallis and Rényi entropies are not well-defined for q = 1, but they both approach the standard Gibbs entropy as q → 1,
so we will use the definition (12a) for q = 1 in (12c–12d).
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1. θ is finite and smooth everywhere except possibly at 0.
2. θ′(x)→ −∞ as x → 0+ and θ′′(x) > 0 for all x > 0.
When h can be decomposed in this way, we will follow Alvarez et al. [2] and say that h is decomposable
with Legendre kernel θ.
Remark 3. The regularity requirement of Definition 1 is just a safety net to ensure that h behaves well
with respect to restrictions and does not exhibit any pathologies near bd(X). Of the examples (12) only
the log-entropy (12b) is not regular because it is identically equal to +∞ on every proper subface of X .
Remark 4. Another technical point that underlies Definition 1 is that we are implicitly assuming that
h is defined on an open neighborhood of X in RA+ so that the derivatives of h are well-defined. The
reason that we are not making this assumption explicit is that it may be done away with as follows:
Let A0 ≡ A \ {α0} and consider the canonical projection proj0 : R
A → RA0 defined in components as
proj0(x0 , x1 , . . . , xn) ≡ x−0 = (x1 , . . . , xn). Then, the image X0 ≡ {w ∈ R
A0 : wµ ≥ 0 and
∑
µ wµ ≤ 1}
of X under proj0 will be homeomorphic to X and the inverse to proj0 on X0 will be the injective immersion
ι0 : RA0 → RA with ι0(w1 , . . . ,wn) = (1 −
∑
µ wµ ,w1 , . . . ,wn). In view of the above, the directional







similarly for the Hessian of h).





the above discussion reduces to treating x0 = 1 −
∑
µ wµ as a dependent variable.Conversely, any smooth
function h : X → R can be extended smoothly to all of RA+ (e.g. via mollification), in which case it is
easy to see that the directional derivatives ∂h∂xµ −
∂h
∂x0





still holds on X . Consequently, we lose no generality in assuming that h is in fact defined
on an open neighborhood of X in RA+ , and we will do so throughout the rest of the paper unless explicitly
stated otherwise. However, the “reduced” coordinates w = proj0(x) and the associated derivations
∂
∂wµ
will be very important in our calculations, so their introduction above is not just a technical triviality.
2.4 Entropy-driven learning dynamics.
Combining the results of the previous two sections on how to assess the long-term performance of an
action and how to translate these assessments into strategies, we obtain the general class of entropy-
driven learning processes :






where Q is the choice map of the driving entropy h : X → R and T is the model’s learning temperature.
From an implementation perspective, the difficulty with (ERL) is twofold: First, for a given entropy
function h, it is not always practical to write the choice function Q in a closed-form expression that the
agent can use to update his strategies.7 Furthermore, even when this is possible, (ERL) is a two-step
computationally intensive process which does not allow the agent to update his strategies directly. The
rest of this section will thus be devoted to writing (ERL) as a continuous-time dynamical system on X
that can be updated with minimal computation overhead.
To that end, it will be convenient to work with a modified set of variables which measure the long-
term difference in performance between an action µ ∈ A and a “flagged” benchmark action α0 ∈ A.
7The case of the Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy is a shining (but, ultimately, misleading) exception to the norm.
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Formally, letting A0 = A \ {α0} as in Remark 4 above, the relative score of an action µ ∈ A0 will be the
difference
zµ = yµ − y0 , (13)
or, more concisely, z = π0(y) where π0 : RA → RA0 is the submersion
π0(y0 , y1 , . . . , yn) = (y1 − y0 , . . . , yn − y0) = (z1 , . . . , zn). (14)
Thereby, the evolution of z over time will be
żµ = ẏµ − ẏ0 = ∆uµ − Tzµ , (ZD)
where now ∆uµ denotes the associated payoff difference ∆uµ ≡ uµ − u0, µ ∈ A0.
The main advantage of introducing the variables z is that even though the choice map Q : RA → X is
not injective (and thus does not admit an inverse),8 there exists a smooth embedding Q0 : RA0 → X0 =
proj0(X) = {x ∈ R
A0 : xµ ≥ 0,
∑







With such an embedding at our disposal, we will then be able to translate the dynamics of z ∈ RA0 to X0,
and thence to X via the inverse ι0 of proj0 on X : ι0(w1 , . . . ,wn) = (1 −
∑
µ wµ ,w1 , . . . ,wn).
To construct Q0 itself, note that (EP) may be rewritten in terms of zµ = yµ − y0 as:
maximize
∑
µ wµzµ − h0(w1 , . . . ,wn),
subject to wµ ≥ 0,
∑
µ wµ ≤ 1,
(EP0)
where h0 ≡ ι∗0h = h ◦ ι0, i.e. h0(w1 , . . . ,wn) = h(1−
∑
µ wµ ,w1 , . . . ,wn). Similarly to (EP), the (unique)











i.e. iff z = F0(w) where F0 : int(X0) → RA0 denotes the gradient F0(w) = ∇ h0(w), w ∈ int(X0). As it
turns out, the required embedding Q0 is simply the inverse of F0:
Lemma 2. Let h : X → R be a generalized entropy function. Then, the map F0 ≡ ∇ h0 : int(X0) → RA0
defined above is a diffeomorphism whose inverse Q0 ≡ F−10 makes the diagram (15) commute.
Proof. Proof. The fact that F0 is a continuous bijection with continuous inverse follows from the general
theory of Legendre-type functions—see e.g. Theorem 26.5 in Rockafellar [26]; the diagram (15) then
commutes on account of the equivalence x = Q(y) ⇔ π0(y) = F0(proj0(x)). Finally, to show that F0 is
indeed a diffeomorphism, note that the Jacobian of F0 is just the Hessian of h0, and with Hess(h) strictly
positive-definite by assumption, our claim follows from the inverse function theorem (see e.g. Lee [17]).

8In fact, Q is constant along (1, . . . , 1): adding c ∈ R to every component of y ∈ RA will not change the solution x = Q(y)
of (EP).
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Having established a diffeomorphism between the variables zµ and wµ , let hµν denote the elements




















Then, letting hµν = ∂wµ∂zν denote the inverse of hµν , and combining the learning scheme (ERL) with the
evolution equation (ZD), we obtain the (unilateral) entropy-driven learning dynamics:








hµν (∆uν − Tzν ) , (18)
where, as before, ∆uν = uν − u0 and zν = ∂h∂xν −
∂h
∂x0
.9 Therefore, if the agent’s payoffs are coming from


























where now hk : Xk → R is the entropy function of player k (generating the corresponding player-specific
choice map Qk : RAk → Xk ) and h
µν
k
is the inverse Hessian matrix of hk defined as in (17).
These dynamics will be the main focus of the rest of our paper, so some remarks are in order:
Remark 1. To get some trivial book-keeping out of the way (and to keep our notation as light as possible),
note that the player-specific entropy functions hk may be encoded in the aggregate entropy h : X → R
with h(x1 , . . . , xN ) =
∑
k hk (xk ), xk ∈ Xk . Likewise, if we set X =
∏
k Xk and replace A with A∗ ≡∐
k Ak in Definition 1, then the player-specific choice maps Qk : RAk → Xk may themselves be encoded





Ak → X associated to h. Therefore, whenever we mention
entropy functions and choice maps in the context of a game (and not simply in a discrete choice problem),
it should be understood that we are referring to the above construction.
Remark 2. It is also important to note that the dynamics (ED) admit global solutions, i.e. solutions that
remain in int(X0) for all t ≥ 0. This can be proven directly using the differential system (ED), but the score
representation (5) probably yields a more transparent view: since the payoff streams uα(t) are Lipschitz
and bounded,10 the scores yα(t) will remain finite for all t ≥ 0, so interior solutions x(t) = Q(y(t)) of
(ED) will be defined for all t ≥ 0 themselves.11
Remark 3. The previous remark brings up an important distinction between interior and non-interior
orbits: strictly speaking, (ED) is only defined on int(X0), so boundary initial conditions must be handled
with more care. To address initial conditions x(0) ∈ X with arbitrary support A′ ≡ supp(x(0)) ⊆ A, it
will be convenient to assume that the entropy h is regular; in that case, by restricting (EP) to the subface
X ′ ≡ ∆(A′) of X , we obtain a similarly restricted choice map Q′ : RA
′
→ X ′ and the agent may proceed
by updating the scores of the supported actions α ∈ A′ in (ERL). In this way, every subface X ′ of X
becomes an invariant manifold of (ERL)/(ED), so entropy-driven dynamics are seen to belong to the
general class of imitative dynamics introduced by Björnerstedt and Weibull [6] (see also Weibull [34]).
Remark 4. In addition to tuning their learning temperature T > 0, players can also try to sharpen their
response model by replacing the choice stage of (ERL) with
xk = Qk (λk yk ) (19)
9Note that ẋ0 = −
∑
µ ẋµ , so the action α0 ∈ A is not being discriminated against).
10Importantly, this property remains true in the case of several agents involved in a finite game.
11Interestingly, for T = 0, this can be seen as an alternative proof of Theorem 4.1 of Alvarez et al. [2] on the existence of global
solutions in Hessian–Riemannian gradient descent dynamics.
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for some λk ≥ 0. As can be seen from (EP), these choice parameters may then be viewed as (player-
specific) inverse choice temperatures: as λk → ∞, the choices of player k freeze down to a “best-
responding” to the stimulus y, whereas for λk → 0, player k mixes actions uniformly, without regards



























We thus see that the inverse temperature λk of the player’s choice model and the temperature T of their
learning model (5) play very different roles on the resulting learning dynamics (EDλ ). The learning
temperature T affects only the entropic correction term of (EDλ ) whereas λk affects all terms of (EDλ )
commensurately; in fact, λk can also be seen as a player-specific change of time, an observation which
will be crucial in considering players with different update schedules in Section 4.
We will close this section by noting that even though the dynamics (ED) are fully updateable on X
(as opposed to the otherwise equivalent process (ERL) which interweaves X and RA), the RHS of (ED)
still contains a non-explicit step in the calculation of the inverse matrix hµν . Given that the computational
complexity of inverting a matrix is polynomial in the size of the matrix, this does not pose much of
a problem in practical applications (after all, it is the number of players that usually explodes, not the
number of actions per player).
That said, (ED) can be simplified considerably if the entropy function which is driving the process
is itself decomposable. Indeed, assume that h(x) =
∑
β θ(xβ) for some non-degenerate Legendre kernel













= θ′′(xµ) δµν + θ′′(x0), (20)
so hµν can be calculated from the following lemma:













Proof. Proof. By simple inspection, we have:
In view of the above inversion formula applied to (20), and setting zkµ = ∂h∂wkµ = θ
′(xkµ) − θ′(xk ,0)































.12 Hence, in the important case

















12Needless to say, θ′′
h
is not a second derivative; we just use this notation for visual consistency.
RR n° 8210
Entropy-driven game dynamics 15









3 Entropy-driven game dynamics and rationality.
In this section, our aim will be to analyze the entropy-driven dynamics (ED) from the point of view
of rational agents, mostly looking to determine their asymptotic convergence properties with respect to
standard game-theoretic solution concepts. Thus, in conjunction with the notion of Nash equilibrium, we
will also focus on the widely studied concept of a quantal response equilibrium :
Definition 4 (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). LetG ≡G(N,A, u) be a finite game in normal form and let
Q : RA → X be a regular choice function. We will say that q ∈ X is a quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
ofG with respect to Q (or a Q-equilibrium for short) when, for some % ≥ 0,




Ak denotes the payoff vector of the profile q ∈ X . More generally, if G′ ≡
G′(N,A′ , u |A′ ) is a restriction of G, we will say that q ∈ X is a restricted QRE of G if it is a QRE
ofG′.
The scale parameter % ≥ 0 will be called the rationality level of the QRE in question. Obviously,
when % = 0, players choose actions uniformly, without any regard to their payoffs; at the other end
of the spectrum, when % → ∞, players become fully rational and the notion of a QRE approximates
smoothly that of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, one could also consider negative rationality levels, in which
case players become anti-rational: for % < 0, the condition x = Q(%u(x)) characterizes the QRE of the
opposite game −G = (N,A, −u), and as % → −∞, these equilibria approximate the Nash equilibria of
−G.
To make this approximation idea more precise, let q∗ ∈ X be a Nash equilibrium of a finite gameG
and let γ : U → X be a smooth curve on X defined on a half-infinite interval of the form U = [a,+∞),
a ∈ R. We will then say that γ is a Q-path to q∗ when γ(%) is a Q-equilibrium ofG with rationality level
% and lim%→∞ γ(%) = q∗; in a similar vein, we will say that q ∈ X is a Q-approximation of q∗ when
q is itself a Q-equilibrium and there is a Q-path joining q to q∗ (van Damme [33] uses the terminology
approachable).
Example 1. By far the most widely used specification of a QRE is the logit equilibrium which cor-
responds to the Gibbs choice map (8): in particular, q ∈ X will be a logit equilibrium of G when
qkα = exp(%ukα(q))/
∑
β exp(%ukβ(q)) for all α ∈ Ak , k ∈ N.
Our first result links the rest points of (ED) at temperature T with the game’s restricted QRE:
Proposition 5. LetG ≡G(N,A, u) be a finite game and let h : X → R be a regular entropy function with
choice map Q : RA → X . Then:
1. For T > 0, the rest points of the entropy-driven dynamics (ED) coincide with the restricted QRE of
G with rationality level % = 1/T .
2. For T = 0, the rest points of (ED) are the restricted Nash equilibria ofG.
3. For T < 0, the rest points of (ED) are the restricted QRE of the opposite game −G.
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Temperature-Adjusted Replicator Dynamics HT=-4L
Figure 1: Phase portraits of the temperature-adjusted replicator dynamics (T-RD) in a 2 × 2 potential game (Nash equilibria are
depicted in dark red and interior rest points in light/dark blue; see labels for the game’s payoffs). For high learning temperatures
T  0, the dynamics cannot keep track of payoffs and their only rest point is a global attractor which approaches the barycenter
of X as T → +∞ (corresponding to a QRE under stochastic perturbations of very high magnitude). As the temperature drops to
around T ≈ 0.935, this attractor becomes unstable and undergoes a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation (a phase transition) resulting
in the appearance of two asymptotically stable QRE that converge to the strict Nash equilibria of the game as T → 0+. For negative
temperatures, the non-equilibrium vertices of X become asymptotically stable (but with a very small basin of attraction), and each
of them gives birth to an unstable equilibrium in a subcritical pitchfork bifurcation. Of these two equilibria, the one closer to
the game’s interior Nash equilibrium is annihilated with the pre-existing QRE at T ≈ −0.278, and as T → −∞, we obtain a
time-inverted image of the T → +∞ portrait with the only remaining QRE repelling all trajectories towards the vertices of X .
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Proof. Proof. Since our focus is on restricted equilibria, it clearly suffices to prove the above correspon-
dences for interior rest points; since the faces of X are forward-invariant under the dynamics (ED), the
general claim then follows from passing to an appropriate restrictionG′ ofG.
To that end, let T > 0 and note that Eq. (13) on the evolution of the relative scores zkµ allows us
to characterize the rest points of (ED) by means of the equation ∆ukµ(x) − Tzkµ = 0; equivalently,
in terms of the absolute scores ykα , we will have ukα(x) − Tykα = ukβ(x) − Tykβ for all α, β ∈ Ak ,
k ∈ N. However, with x = Q(y), we will also have ykα − ∂h∂xkα = ykβ −
∂h
∂xkβ
, so we readily obtain
ukα(x) − T ∂h∂xkα = ukβ(x) − T
∂h
∂xkβ
; in turn, this shows that x = Q(T−1u(x)), so x is a Q-equilibrium of
G with rationality level % = 1/T .
For T = 0 the result is immediate because (13) shows that x ∈ X is an interior rest point of (ED) if
and only if ukα(x) = ukβ(x) for all α, β ∈ Ak , k ∈ N, i.e. if and only if x is an interior Nash equilibrium
ofG (recall that the Hessian of h is non-singular). Finally, the time inversion t 7→ −t in (ED) is equivalent
to the inversion u 7→ −u, T 7→ −T , so our claim for negative T follows from the case T > 0. 
Remark 1. Proposition 5 shows that the temperature T of the dynamics (ED) plays a double role: on the
one hand, it determines the discount (or reinforcement) factor in the players’ assessment phase (5), so it
reflects the importance that they give to past events; on the other hand, T also determines the rationality
level of the rest points of (ED), measuring how far the stationary points of the players’ learning process
are from being Nash. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this dual role of the temperature is brought to the forefront
by the probabilistic/perturbed interpretation of quantal responses as choice probabilities in the case of
stochastically perturbed payoffs. Indeed, recalling the relevant discussion of Section 2.3, we see that a
QRE with rationality level % = T−1 corresponds to best responding in the presence of a noise process
with standard deviation ε ∝ %−1 = T . On that account, the players’ learning temperature simply measures
the inherent variance (inverse rationality) of a QRE, just as the physical notion of temperature measures
the variance of the random motions of the particles that make up a thermodynamic system (e.g. an ideal
gas following Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics).
Of course, stationarity does not capture the long-term behavior of a dynamical system, so the rest
of our analysis will be focused on the convergence properties of (ED). To that end, we begin with the
special case of potential games where the players’ payoff functions are aligned along a common potential
function as in Eq. (2). In this setting, our first result is that for small temperatures, the game’s potential
function is “almost” increasing along the solution orbits of (ED):
Lemma 6. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite potential game with potential U , and let h : X → R be a
generalized entropy function. Then, the function F(x) ≡ Th(x)−U(x) is Lyapunov for the entropy-driven
dynamics (ED): for any interior orbit x(t) of (ED), we will have d
dt
F(x(t)) ≤ 0 with equality if and only
if x(0) is a QRE ofG (or −G for T < 0).
Proof. Proof. By expressing F in the reduced coordinates wkµ = xkµ that we used in the derivation of






































, i.e. if and only if x is a QRE ofG (or −G for T < 0; cf. the proof of Proposition 5). 
When the players’ entropy function is regular, Lemma 6 can be easily extended to orbits lying on any
subface X ′ of X simply by considering the restricted QRE of the game that are supported in X ′. Even in
that case however, Lemma 6 makes no distinction between positive and negative temperatures and simply
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shows that the dynamics (ED) will tend to move towards the minimizers of F on X ′. What changes with
the sign of T is the relation that these minimizers have with regards to restricted QRE: for T < 0, the only
local minimizers of F are the vertices of X (which are themselves pure restricted QRE),13 whereas for
T > 0, the restricted QRE ofG that are supported in a subface X ′ of X coincide with the local minimizers
of F |X ′ . Formally, Lemma 6 and the above reasoning give:
Proposition 7. Let h : X → R be a regular entropy function and let x(t) be a solution orbit of the
associated entropic dynamics (ED) for a potential gameG. Then:
1. For T > 0, x(t) converges to a restricted QRE ofG with the same support as x(0).
2. For T = 0, x(t) converges to a restricted Nash equilibrium whose support is contained in that of
x(0).
3. For T < 0, x(t) converges to a vertex of X or is stationary (if x(0) is a restricted QRE of −G).
The above proposition will be our main result for potential games, so some remarks are in order:
Remark 1. By continuity, the phase portrait of the entropy-driven dynamics for small temperatures (pos-
itive or negative) will be broadly similar to the base case T = 0 (at least, in the generic case where there
are no payoff ties in G). Accordingly, the main difference between positive and negative temperatures
is that for small T < 0 the dynamics converge to a bona fide (pure) Nash equilibrium for most initial
conditions (except for a small basin of attraction around each vertex of X which pulls the dynamics to
non-equilibrium vertices), whereas for small T > 0, interior solutions of (ED) always converge to a Q-
approximation of a Nash equilibrium (see also Fig. 1). As we shall see in Section 4, the fact that the
entropy-driven dynamics always converge to the vicinity of a Nash equilibrium for small T > 0 will be
crucial in the presence of imperfect payoff information and/or stochastic fluctuations.
Remark 2. Interpreting the game’s potential U as the internal energy of a thermodynamic system, then,
modulo a change of sign,the Lyapunov function F(x) = Th(x) −U(x) is known in statistical physics as
the (Helmholtz) free energy and measures the useful work that can be obtained from a thermodynamic
system at constant temperature (Landau and Lifshitz [16]).14 In this context, the principle of energy
minimization states that the free energy of an isolated system never increases, so Lemma 6 may be viewed
as a corollary of the Second Law of Thermodynamics: under constant temperature, the free energy of the
system decreases until it reaches a thermal equilibrium.
The previous discussion establishes a fundamental qualitative difference between positive and nega-
tive learning temperatures in potential games: for T < 0, every vertex of X is attracting in (ED), while
for T > 0, the dynamics can only converge to interior points. As we show below, this behavior actually
applies to any finite game:
Proposition 8. Let h : X → R be a regular entropy function. Then:
1. For negative temperatures T < 0, every vertex q ∈ X is attracting in the entropic dynamics (ED).
2. For positive temperaturesT > 0, anyω-limit point of an interior solution orbit x(t) is itself interior;
in fact, the ω-limit set of int(X) and the boundary bd(X) of X are separated by neighborhoods.




= 0 for all α ∈ Ak , k ∈ N, on account of U




> 0 on account of h having a positive-definite Hessian.
14Recall that our sign convention for the entropy is the opposite of physics and probability; furthermore, potentials are minimized
in physics, so h and U should be replaced by −h and −U respectively, yielding the familiar expression F = U − Th (Landau and
Lifshitz [16]).
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. In integral form, we have:
zkµ(t) = zkµ(0)e−Tt +
∫ t
0
e−T (t−s)∆ukµ(x(s)) ds, (23)
so, with ∆ukµ bounded on X , the last integral will be bounded in absolute value by
Mk
T
(1 − e−Tt ) for
some Mk > 0. We will thus have(
zkµ(0) + Mk/T
)





and for T > 0, any ω-limit point of (13) will lie in the rectangle CT = {z ∈
∏
k R
Ak ,0 : |zkµ | ≤ Mk/T }.
However, the image of CT under the reduced choice map Q0 :
∏
RAk ,0 → X0 will be a compact set that
is wholly contained in the interior of X0, thus proving our assertion for T > 0.
On the other hand, for T < 0, (24) shows that if we pick zkµ(0) < −Mk/|T |, then we will have
limt→∞ zkµ(t) = −∞ for all µ ∈ Ak ,0, k ∈ N. Since the set UT = {z ∈
∏
k R
Ak ,0 : zkµ < −Mk |T |−1} is
a neighborhood of (−∞, . . . , −∞) in
∏
k R
Ak ,0 which is mapped diffeomorphically by Q0 to the relative
interior of a neighborhood of (0, . . . , 0) in X0, it follows that the pure vertex q = (α1,0 , . . . , αN,0) of X
attracts all nearby interior solutions of (ED). By restriction, this property will hold on any subface of X
which contains q, and with the choice of flagged actions αk ,0 ∈ Ak being arbitrary, our proof is complete.

This dichotomy in the behavior of the entropic dynamics (ED) for positive and negative temperature
ties in with the following result which is of independent interest:
Proposition 9. Let h : X → R be a generalized entropy function. Then, there exists a volume form Volh
on int(X) such that ifU0 ⊆ X is relatively open in X and cl(U0) ∩ bd(X) = ∅, then:
Volh(Ut ) = Volh(U0) exp(−A0Tt), (25)
where A0 = card(
∐
k Ak ) − card(N) =
∑
k (card(Ak ) − 1), and Ut ≡ {x(t) : x(0) ∈ U0}. Hence, the
entropy-driven game dynamics (ED) are contracting for T > 0, expanding for T < 0 and incompressible
iff T = 0.
Proof. Proof. Again, our proof will be based on the dynamics (13) for the relative score variables zkµ ,




, which are related to the mixed strategy variables x ∈ X via the commutative
diagram (15): Q0(z) = proj0(x). Indeed, if V0 is an open set of
∏
k R
Ak and Wkµ = ∆ukµ(x) − Tzkµ






divW dV , (26)
where dV =
∧
k ,µ dzkµ is the ordinary Euclidean volume form of
∏
k R
Ak ,0 , Vol denotes the associated
(Lebesgue) measure, and Vt is the image of V0 at time t under (13), viz. Vt = {z(t) : z(0) ∈ V0}. However,
since ∆ukµ does not depend on zk (because ukµ and uk ,0 themselves do not depend on xk ), we will have
∂Wkµ
∂zkµ
= −T . Hence, summing over all µ ∈ Ak ,0, k ∈ N, we obtain divW = −
∑
k (card(Ak ) − 1)T =
−A0T , and by integrating, we obtain the volume evolution equation Vol(Vt ) = Vol(V0) exp(−A0Tt).
In view of the above, let Volh = proj∗0(Q
−1
0 )
∗ Vol be the push-forward of the Euclidean volume Vol(·)
to int(X) via the diffeomorphism Q−10 ◦ proj0 : int(X)→
∏
k R
Ak , i.e. Volh(U) = Vol(Q−10 (proj0(U))) for
any relatively open set U ∈ int(X). Then, taking V0 such that proj0(U0) = Q0(V0), our assertion follows
from the volume evolution equation above by recalling that proj0(x(t)) = Q0(z(t)). 
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Interestingly, in the special case of the Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy at zero temperature, Proposition 9
yields the classical result that the asymmetric replicator dynamics (RD) are incompressible and hence do
not admit interior attractors (Hofbauer and Sigmund [13], Ritzberger and Weibull [25]).15 We thus see
that incompressibility characterizes a much more general class of dynamics and, in our learning context,
it is simply a consequence of the players assigning a uniform weight to their past observations (neither
discounting, nor reinforcing them).
That said, in the case of the replicator dynamics, we have a significantly clearer picture for the stability
and attraction properties of a game’s equilibria thanks to the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory
(Hofbauer and Sigmund [13]). In particular, it is well known that:
1. If an interior trajectory converges, its limit is Nash.
2. If a state is Lyapunov stable, then it is also Nash.
3. A state is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium.16
By comparison, in the context of our more general class of entropy-driven game dynamics we obtain:
Theorem 10. LetG ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game and let h : X → R be a regular entropy function with
choice map Q :
∏
k R
Ak → X . Then, the entropy-driven dynamics (ED) have the following properties:
1. For positive temperatures T > 0, if q ∈ X is Lyapunov stable then it is also a QRE ofG; moreover,
if q is a Q-approximate strict Nash equilibrium and T is small enough, then q is also asymptotically
stable.
2. For T = 0, if q ∈ X is Lyapunov stable, then it is also a Nash equilibrium ofG; furthermore, q is
asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium ofG.
3. Finally, for T < 0, a profile q ∈ X will be asymptotically stable if and only if it is pure (i.e. a vertex
of X); any other rest point of (ED) is unstable.
Proof. Proof. Our proof will be broken up in three parts based on the temperature of the dynamics (ED):
Positive temperatures. Let T > 0 and assume that q ∈ X is Lyapunov stable (and, hence, stationary).
Clearly, if q is interior, it will be a QRE of G by Proposition 5 so there is nothing to show. Suppose
therefore that q ∈ bd(X); then, by Proposition 8, we may pick a neighborhoodU of q in X such that cl(U)
does not contain anyω-limit points of the interior of X under (ED). However, since q is Lyapunov stable,
any interior solution that is wholly contained inU will have an ω-limit in cl(U), a contradiction.
Regarding asymptotic stability, we will make the simplifying technical assumption that the entropy
function h is decomposable with the same Legendre kernel θ for all players (the proof is entirely sim-
ilar in the general case, but significantly more painful to write down). Assuming further that q∗ =
(α1,0 , . . . , αN,0) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G and let q ≡ q(T ) ∈ X be a Q-approximation of q∗
with rationality level % = 1/T . Then, letting Wkµ = ∆ukµ − Tzkµ denote the RHS of the dynamics (13),







−T if ` = k, ν = µ,




(q) ∂∂w`ρ ∆ukµ otherwise,
(27)
15This does not hold in the symmetric case: there the proof breaks down because the symmetrized payoff uα (x) depends on xα .
16Recall that q ∈ X is said to be Lyapunov stable (or stable) when for every neighborhood U of q in X , there exists a
neighborhood V of q in X such that if x(0) ∈ V then x(t ) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, q is called attracting when there
exists a neighborhood U of q in X such that limt→∞ x(t ) = q if x(0) ∈ U , and q is called asymptotically stable when it is both
stable and attracting.
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where hνρ
`

























Since q is a Q-approximation of the strict equilibrium q∗ = (α1,0 , . . . , αN,0), we will also have
qkµ ≡ qkµ(T ) → q∗kµ = 0 and qk ,0 → q
∗
k ,0 = 1 as T → 0
+. Moreover, recalling that q is a QRE of
G with rationality level % = 1/T , we will also have ∆ukµ(q) = Tθ′(qkµ) − Tθ′(qk ,0), implying in turn
that Tθ′(qkµ(T )) → ∆ukµ(q∗) < 0 as T → 0+. However, with h regular, the Legendre kernel θ of h will












Thus, on account of (28) and (29), the off-diagonal elements of (27) will be o(T ) as T → 0+, so, by
continuity, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the vector field W evaluated at q ≡ q(T ) will all be negative
if T > 0 is small enough. As a result, q will be a hyperbolic rest point of (13), so it will also be structurally
stable by the Hartman-Grobman theorem, and hence asymptotically stable as well.
Zero temperature. For T = 0, let q be Lyapunov stable so every neighborhood U of q in X admits an
interior orbit x(t) that stays inU for all t ≥ 0; we then claim that q is Nash. Indeed, assume ad abusrdum
that αk ,0 ∈ supp(q) has uk ,0(q) < ukµ(q) for some µ ∈ Ak and let U be a neighborhood of q such that
xk ,0 > qk ,0/2 and ∆ukµ(x) ≥ m > 0 for all x ∈ U . Then, picking an orbit x(t) that is wholly contained in
U , the integral equation (23) gives zkµ(t) ≥ zk ,0(0) + mt , implying in turn that zkµ(t) → +∞ as t → ∞.
However, with zkµ = ∂h∂xkµ −
∂h
xk ,0
and h regular this is only possible if xkµ(t)→ 0, a contradiction.





usual. To show first that q is Lyapunov stable, it will be again convenient to work with the relative scores
zkµ and show that if m ∈ R is sufficiently negative, then every trajectory z(t) that starts in the open set
Um = {z ∈
∏
k R
Ak ,0 : zkµ < m} always stays in Um ; since Um is a neighborhood of (−∞, . . . , −∞) in∏
k R
Ak ,0 , this is easily seen to imply Lyapunov stability for q in X .
In view of the above, pick m ∈ R so that ∆ukµ(x(z)) ≤ −ε < 0 for all z ∈ Um and let τm = inf{t :
z(t) < Um } be the time it takes z(t) to escape Um . Then, if τm is finite and t ≤ τm , the integral form (23)
of the relative score dynamics (13) readily yields
zkµ(t) = zkµ(0) +
∫ t
0
∆ukµ(Q0(z(s))) ds ≤ zkµ(0) − εt < m for all µ ∈ Ak ,0, k ∈ N. (30)
Thus, substituting τm for t in (30), we obtain a contradiction to the definition of τm and we may conclude
that z(t) always stays withinUm if m is chosen negative enough – i.e. q is Lyapunov stable.
To show that q is in addition attracting, it suffices to let t → ∞ in (30) and recall that Q0(z) → q
when z → (−∞, . . . , −∞). Finally, for the converse implication, assume that q is not pure; in particular,
assume that q lies in the relative interior of a non-singleton subface X ′ – spanned by supp(q). Then,
with h regular, Proposition 9 shows that q cannot attract a relatively open neighborhood U′ of initial
conditions in X ′ because (ED) remains volume-preserving when restricted to any subface X ′ of X . In
turn, this implies that q cannot be attracting in X and precludes asymptotic stability, as claimed.
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Negative temperatures. ForT < 0, the fact that every vertex of X is attracting follows from Proposition
8; Lyapunov stability then follows from (24) by noting that if zkµ(0) < −Mk |T |−1, then we will have
zkµ(t) < zkµ(0) for all t ≥ 0 (cf. the proof of Proposition 8). Conversely, assume that q ∈ X is a non-pure
Lyapunov stable state. Then, by passing to a subface of X if necessary, we may assume that q is actually
interior. In that case however, if we take an interior neighborhood U of q in X , Proposition 9 shows that
any neighborhood V of q that is contained in U will eventually grow to a volume larger than that of U
under (ED), so there is no open set of trajectories contained inU . This shows that non-pure rest points of
(ED) cannot be stable and our proof is complete. 
In conjunction with our previous results, Theorem 10 provides an interesting insight into the role of
the dynamics’ temperature parameterT : for smallT > 0, the dynamics (ED) are attracted to the interior of
X and they only converge to points that are approximately Nash; for small T < 0, the bona fide strict Nash
equilibria of the game are indeed asymptotically stable, but so are all the vertices of X (albeit with very
small basins of attractions); finally, for T = 0, the dynamics (ED) are attracted to strict Nash equilibria
and only there (see also Fig. 1). We thus obtain the following rule of thumb: for T > 0, the dynamics
(ED) converge to states that are almost Nash, whereas for T < 0, the dynamics converge to Nash states
except for a very small fraction of initial conditions.
As such, from the point of view of control and optimization, if one seeks to reach the strict Nash
equilibria of the game (e.g. as is usually the case when the game is a potential one), it would appear that
the zero temperature case provides the best convergence properties. Nonetheless, there are two important
caveats to keep in mind: First, if the dynamics (ED) are to be properly implemented as a discrete-time
algorithm, then the results of the next section show that the positive temperature regime is much more
stable – all the while allowing players to converge arbitrarily close to a strict equilibrium. On the other
hand, if one is only interested in the convergence speed of the dynamics (ED), then even arbitrarily small
negative temperatures yield convergence rates that are exponentially faster than the T = 0 case:
Proposition 11. Let G ≡ G(N,A, u) be a finite game and let h : X → R be a regular entropy function
with choice map Q :
∏
k R
Ak → X . If q∗ = (α1,0 , . . . , αN,0) is a strict equilibrium of G and x(t) is an
interior solution of (ED) which starts sufficiently close to q∗, then, for all T ≤ 0, we will have
zkµ(t) ∼ zkµ(0)e |T |t + ∆ukµ(q∗)
e |T |t − 1
|T |
, (31)
where, as before, zkµ = ∂h∂xkµ −
∂h
∂xk ,0
are the relative scores of the players’ equilibrium actions, ∆ukµ =
ukµ − uk ,0 are the corresponding payoff differences, and we are using the notational convention (e0t −
1)/0 = t .
Put differently, we will have zkµ(t) = O(exp(|T |t)) for T < 0 and zkµ(t) = O(t) for T = 0: the relative
scores zkµ escape to negative infinity exponentially faster for T < 0 than for T = 0.
Corollary 12. If q∗ = (α1,0 , . . . , αN,0) is a strict Nash equilibrium ofG and x(t) is an interior solution
of the temperature-adjusted replicator dynamics (T-RD) that starts close enough to q∗, then
xk ,0(t) ∼
1 − e−O(exp(|T |t )) for T < 0,1 − e−O(t ) for T = 0. (32)
By contrast, lim supt→∞ xk ,0(t) < 1 whenever T > 0.
Remark 1. It is not too hard to obtain expressions similar to (32) for more general choice functions Q,
but the end result is not as concise, so we omit it.
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Proof. (Proposition 11.) Pick some ε > 0 and let x(t) start close enough to q∗ so that (1 + ε)∆ukµ(q∗) ≤
∆ukµ(x(t)) ≤ (1−ε)∆ukµ(q∗); that this is possible follows from the Lyapunov property of strict equilibria




, k ∈ N, because
q∗ is a strict equilibrium ofG). We will thus have:
(1 + ε)∆ukµ(q∗) ≤ żkµ + Tzkµ ≤ (1 − ε)∆ukµ(q∗), (33)








with the convention that (e0t − 1)/0 = t . Our assertion then follows by rearranging terms in (34) above
and noting that ε can be taken arbitrarily small since zkµ(t)→ −∞ for all µ ∈ Ak ,0, k ∈ N. 






so the estimate (32) follows from (31) and the Taylor expansion 1/(1 + s) ∼ 1 − s + O(s2). 
4 Discrete-time learning algorithms and stochastic approximations.
In this section, we examine how the entropy-driven dynamics (ERL) and (ED) may be used to design and
implement learning algorithms in the context of finite games that are played repeatedly over time. The
main challenge in this endeavor is that in practical implementations, players can only observe the payoffs
that they actually received when playing the game (or even only a noisy version thereof), whereas the
dynamics (ERL)/(ED) involve the expected payoff functions ukα(x). Therefore, in the absence of perfect
monitoring (or any other device permitting the calculation of expected payoffs), any discretization of the
dynamics (ERL)/(ED) should involve only the players in-game payoff streams and no other information.
A natural way of addressing this issue is to take an Euler-like discretization of the dynamics, use the
players’ evolving mixed strategies to select an action at each stage, and update only those components
for which payoffs were actually observed. In what follows, we will give a brief account of this approach
(known as stochastic approximation) and then apply it directly to the dynamics (ERL) and (ED).
4.1 Stochastic approximation of continuous dynamics.
For completeness, we recall here a few general elements from the theory of stochastic approximation
following Benaïm [5] and Borkar [8]. To begin with, let S be a finite set, and let Z(n), n ∈ N be a
RS-valued stochastic process that satisfies the recursion
Z(n + 1) = Z(n) + γn+1U(n + 1), (35)
where γn is a sequence of step sizes (usually assumed to vanish with n) and U(n) is another RS-valued
process which is adapted to the filtration F of Z . Then, if there exists a Lipschitz-continuous vector field
f : RS → RS such that E[U(n + 1)|Fn] = f (Z(n)), we will say that (35) is a stochastic approximation of
the continuous-time dynamical system
ż = f (z). (MD)
More explicitly, if we split the so-called innovation term U(n) of (35) into its average value f (Z(n)) =
E[U(n)|Fn] and a zero-mean noise term V (n + 1) = U(n + 1) − f (Z(n)), (35) may be rewritten as
Z(n + 1) = Z(n) + γn+1 ( f (Z(n)) +V (n + 1)) , (SA)
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which is easily seen to be a noisy Euler-like discretization of (MD); conversely, the equation (MD) will
be referred to as the mean dynamics of the stochastic recursion (SA).
The main goal of the theory of stochastic approximation is to relate the process (SA) with the solution
trajectories of the mean dynamics (MD). To that end, the standard assumptions that ensure that this
comparison is possible are:
(A1) The step sequence γn is (`2 − `1)–summable (typically, γn = 1/n).





(A3) The stochastic process Z(n) is bounded: supn ‖Z(n)‖ < ∞ (a.s.).
Under these assumptions, the following lemma ensures that Z(n) can only converge to a connected set of
rest points of the corresponding mean dynamics:
Lemma 13. Assume that the dynamics (MD) admit a strict Lyapunov function (i.e. a real-valued function
which decreases along every non-stationary solution orbit of (MD)), and assume further that the set of
values of this function at the rest points of (MD) has measure zero in R. Then, under the assumptions
(A1)–(A3), every accumulation point of the process Z(n) generated by the recursion (SA) belongs to a
connected set of rest points of the mean dynamics (MD).
Proof. Proof. Our claim is a direct consequence of the following string of results in Benaïm [5] (listed
in order of successive implications): Proposition 4.2, Proposition 4.1, Theorem 5.7, and Proposition 6.4.

As an application of the previous lemma, let us consider a game G and a stochastic approximation
of the entropy-driven dynamics (ED) that satisfies conditions (A1)–(A3). IfG admits a potential function
U , Lemma 6 shows that the free entropy F = Th − U is Lyapunov for the entropy-driven dynamics
(ERL)/(ED), and Sard’s theorem (Lee [17]) ensures that the set of values taken by F at its critical points
has measure zero. Thus, in view of Proposition 5, we see that stochastic approximations of (ERL)/(ED)
may only converge to connected sets of restricted QRE ofG. In what follows, we will exploit this property
in order to derive two entropy-driven learning algorithms based respectively on the score dynamics (ERL)
and the strategy-based dynamics (ED).
Remark 1. We should note here that (SA) implicitly assumes that each component of the vector Z is
updated simultaneously. In a game theoretic setting, this corresponds to complete player synchronization,
an assumption which does not always hold; we will address such issues in Section 4.4.
4.2 Score-based implementation of entropy-driven learning.
We begin by constructing a discrete-time stochastic approximation of the score-based entropic dynamics
(ERL) as follows: at each step, players play a smoothed best response to the performance scores of their
actions (using the choice map Q defined in Section 2.3), and then update these scores depending on the
payoffs they receive from the chosen action. We illustrate this process in Algorithm 1 below (presented
in a synchronous version, with players selecting actions and receiving payoffs simultaneously):
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Algorithm 1 Score-based learning with entropy-driven action selection.
n ← 0
foreach player k ∈ N and action α ∈ Ak do initialize Ykα and set Xk ← Qk (Yk )
Repeat
n ← n + 1
foreach player k ∈ N simultaneously do
select a new action α̂k according to the mixed strategy Xk # current action
ûk ← uk (α̂) # current payoff
Yk α̂k ← Yk α̂k + γn(ûk − TYk α̂k )/Xk α̂k # update current action score
foreach action α ∈ Ak do Xkα ← Qkα(Yk ) # update mixed strategy
To study the convergence properties of Algorithm 1, let Y (n) denote the players’ score profile at the
n-th iteration of the algorithm – and similarly for X(n) (strategies), α̂(n) (actions) and û(n) (payoffs).
Then, Y (n) is a stochastic process adapted to the filtration Fn generated by X and satisfies the relation:
E
[
(Ykα(n + 1) − Ykα(n))/γn+1 | Fn
]
= E[ûk (n + 1)|Fn] − TYkα(n) = ukα(X(n)) − TYkα(n), (36)
for all α ∈ Ak , k ∈ N. Together with the selection rule Xk (n) = Qk (Yk (n)), the RHS of the above
expression yields the entropy-driven score dynamics (ERL), so the strategy process X(n) generated by
Algorithm 1 will be a stochastic approximation of (ERL).
In the special case where T = 1, Algorithm 1 boils down to the Q-learning scheme of Leslie and
Collins [18] which, under the assumption that Y (n) remains bounded (a.s.), was proven to converge to
Nash distributions (the analogue of a QRE with rationality level % = 1) in various classes of 2-player
games. Unfortunately, the unconditional convergence of this algorithm still eludes us because assump-
tions (A2) and (A3) are hard to verify: in fact, one can check that the order of the noise term V (n) is
E[‖V (n + 1)‖2 |Fn] = O((1 + ‖Y (n)‖2)e‖Y (n)‖ ), (37)
so (A2) rests on first establishing the boundedness requirement (A3).17 However, establishing (A3) is not
trivial in itself because of the “almost surely” requirement; it seems to be possible to do so thanks to
an argument by M. Faure (personal communication), but since Algorithm 1 is not the main focus of our
paper, we will not venture further along this direction.
There exists other conditions (replacing Assumptions A1, A2 and A3) under which convergence can
be proved. A possible track to prove convergence without requiring a priori boundedness of V (n) is to
truncate the stochastic approximation with expanding bounds. This approach is used in ? [? ], but again,
the required summability conditions on E[| |V (n + 1)| |2 |Fn] are not satisfied in our case unless (Y (n)) is
bounded. In any case, our focus is more on the following strategy-based algorithm, where boundedness
is guaranteed.
4.3 Strategy-based implementation of entropy-driven learning.
In this section, we will focus on the strategy-based variant of the entropic game dynamics (ED), and we
will implement it as a payoff-based learning procedure in discrete time. One of the advantages of this
approach is that it does not rely on having a closed form expression for the choice map Q (which is hard
to obtain for non-Boltzmann action selection); another is that since the algorithm is strategy-based (and
hence its update variables are bounded by default), we will not need to worry too much about satisfying
17Note that this is also true for the weaker requirement supplied by Borkar [8], namely that there exist K such that E[| |V (n +
1)| |2 |Fn ] ≤ K (1 + | |Yn | |2) for all n.
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conditions (A2) and (A3) as in the case of Algorithm 1. As a result, the strategy-based implementation of
the entropic game dynamics (ED) will be significantly easier to handle than its score-based variant.
Without further ado, we have:
Algorithm 2 Strategy-based implementation of entropy-driven learning.
n ← 0
foreach player k ∈ N do initialize Xk as a mixed strategy with full support
Repeat
n ← n + 1
foreach player k ∈ N simultaneously do
select a new action α̂k according to the mixed strategy Xk # current action
foreach player k ∈ N do
ûk ← uk (α̂1 , . . . , α̂N ) # current payoff
foreach action α ∈ Ak do # update mixed strategy





















θ′′(Xkβ) is the entropy adjustment term of (ED).
As stated above, the update step of Algorithm 2 has been designed so as to track the entropic dynamics
(ED). Indeed, letting X(n) (resp. α̂(n), û(n)) denote the players’ strategy (resp. action, payoff) profile at
the n-th iteration of the algorithm, we will have for all α ∈ Ak , k ∈ N:
E
[
















which is simply the RHS of the entropy-driven dynamics (ED) evaluated at X(n).
Remark 1. In the case of the Boltzmann-Gibbs kernel θ(x) = x log x, the update step (38) becomes
Xkα ← Xkα + γn+1
[




β Xkβ log Xkβ
)]
. (40)
For zero temperatures, we thus obtain the reinforcement learning scheme of Sastry et al. [29] that was
based on the classical replicator equation (RD).
On the other hand, unlike Algorithm 1 (which was evolving in RA), Algorithm 2 is well-defined only
if the iterates X are admissible mixed strategies at each update step. To check that this indeed the case,
note first that the second term of the RHS of (38) vanishes when summed over α ∈ Ak , so
∑k
α Xkα(n)
remains constant and equal to 1 (recall that Xk (0) is initialized as a valid probability distribution). It thus
suffices to check that Xkα(n) ≥ 0 for all α ∈ Ak ; restricting ourselves to positive learning temperatures
T > 0 and normalizing the game’s payoffs to [0, 1] for simplicity, we have:
Lemma 14. Let θ be a regular entropy kernel such that xθ′′(x) ≥ m for some m > 0 and for all x ∈ (0, 1).
Then, for T > 0 and normalized payoffs uk : A → [0, 1], there exists a positive constant K > 0 (which
only depends on T and θ) such that if the step sequence γn is bounded from above by K , then Xkα(n) ≥ 0
for all α ∈ Ak , k ∈ N, and for all n ≥ 0.
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Proof. Proof. For notational simplicity, we will only consider here the single-player case, the general
case being similar. To that end, we first claim that the entropic term gk of (38) is bounded by a constant
Cθ ; indeed:
• θ′ is increasing, hence θ′(ξ) ≤ θ′(1) for all ξ ∈ (0, 1).
• For all x ∈ X ≡ ∆(A),
∑
β 1/θ′′(xβ) ≥ maxβ 1/θ′′(xβ), so θ′′h (x) ≤ minβ θ
′′(xβ) ≤ max{θ′′(ξ) :
card(A)−1 ≤ ξ ≤ 1}. Thus there exists θ′′
h ,max such that θ
′′
h ,max ≥ θ
′′
h
(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X .
• By the regularity assumption for θ, we will have θ′(ξ)/θ′′(ξ)→ 0 as ξ → 0+, so there exists M > 0
such that |θ′(ξ)/θ′′(x)| < M for all ξ ∈ (0, 1).
As a result, our claim follows by taking Cθ = θ′(1) + θ′′h ,max card(A)M .




































where we used the assumption T ≥ 0 for the first inequality and the normalization û ∈ [0, 1] for the






≡ K , we will have Xα(n+ 1) ≥ Xα(n)(1−
γn+1K ) ≥ 0 whenever Xα(n) ≥ 0, and the induction is complete. 
Under the assumptions of Lemma 14 above, Algorithm 2 is well-defined and is no risk of crashing;
we now show that ifG is a potential game, then Algorithm 2 converges to a QRE ofG almost surely:
Theorem 15. LetG be a potential game, and let θ be a regular entropy kernel such that xθ′′(x) ≥ m for
some m > 0 and for all x ∈ (0, 1). Then, for T > 0 and sufficiently small step sizes γn satisfying (A1),
Algorithm 2 converges almost surely to a connected set of QRE ofG with rationality level 1/T .
Proof. Proof. By the proof of Lemma 14, assumptions (A2) and (A3) for the iterates X(n) of Algorithm
2 are verified immediately – simply note that the innovation term of (38) is bounded by the constant K
of Lemma 14. Thus, by Lemma 13 and the subsequent discussion, it follows that X(n) converges to a
connected set of restricted QRE ofG.
We will now show that the accumulation points of X(n) can only lie in the relative interior rel int(X)
of X . To that end, let zkµ = θ′(xkµ) − θ′(xk ,0) be the reduced score variables of (13) and let Wkµ =
∆ukµ − Tzkµ denote the RHS of the reduced score dynamics (ZD), viz. ż = W (z). Then, following
Borkar and Meyn [7], the limiting ODE of the dynamics (ZD) will be:
ż = W∞(z) ≡ lim
r→∞




= −Tz , (ZD∞)
where Q0 : z 7→ x is the reduced choice map of Eq. (15). For T > 0, the origin is a global attractor
of (ZD∞), so Theorem 2.1 in Borkar and Meyn [7] implies that the discrete stochastic approximation
Zkµ(n) = θ′(Xkµ(n)) − θ′(Xk ,0(n)) of (ZD) will be bounded almost surely. Moreover, given that Q0 is a
homeomorphism onto rel int(X), the image of any compact subset of
∏
k R
Ak ,0 will be a compact subset
of rel int(X), so any accumulation point of the process X = Q0(Z) will lie in rel int(X), as claimed. Since
X(n) was shown to converge to a connected set of restricted QRE ofG, our assertion follows. 
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Remark 1. It is important to note here that Theorem 15 holds for any T > 0, so Algorithm 2 may be
tuned to converge to QRE with arbitrarily high rationality level % = 1/T – and hence, arbitrarily close
to the game’s strict Nash equilibria; cf. the discussion following Theorem 10 in Section 3. In this
way, Theorem 15 is different in scope than the convergence results of Cominetti et al. [10] and Bravo
[9]: instead of taking high learning temperatures to guarantee a unique QRE, players who employ low
learning temperatures may converge arbitrarily close to the game’s strict equilibria.
Remark 2. In view of the above, one might hope that Algorithm 2 would still converge to the game’s
(strict) Nash equilibria even for T = 0. In that case however, the limiting ODE (ZD∞) no longer admits a
global attractor at the origin, so the relative scores Zkµ no longer remain bounded and we cannot discount
the convergence of Algorithm 2 to non-Nash vertices of X . In fact, even in the simplest possible case of
a single player game with two actions, Lamberton et al. [15] showed that the T = 0 version of Algorithm
2 with Boltzmann action selection fails to converge a.s. to a Nash equilibrium for step sequences of the
form γn = 1/nh , 0 < h < 1.
4.4 Robustness of the strategy-based learning algorithm.
Even though Algorithm 2 only requires players to observe and record their in-game payoffs, it still relies
on the following assumptions: a) that players have perfect measurements of their payoffs (or that the same
action profile always yields the exact same payoffs); b) that players all play at the same time; and c) that
there is no delay between playing and receiving payoffs. Since these assumptions are often violated in
practical scenarios, we devote the rest of this section to examining the robustness of Algorithm 2 in this
more general setting.
Noisy measurements and stochastic perturbations. In many real-world applications of game theory
(and especially in traffic congestion games), the payoffs received by the players at each stage of the game
may be subject to random shocks (Hofbauer and Sandholm [12], Mertikopoulos and Moustakas [23]) or
players may only be able to get a rough measurement of their true payoffs (see e.g. ? [? ] for an example
drawn from revenue sharing and mechanism design).
We will model such stochastic perturbations by considering a random noise term ξk (n), k ∈ N, which
is added to the payoff ûk (n) received by player k at the n-th iteration of Algorithm 2 (and which, in
principle, might depend on the players’ strategy or action profiles). Then, with notation as before, we
have:
Proposition 16. Let ξ(n) be an Fn-adapted difference of martingale with values in RN (i.e. E[ξ(n +
1)|Fn] = 0); assume further that ξk is bounded for all k ∈ N (a.s.) and that ξk is stochastically indepen-
dent of the chosen action α̂k of player k. Then, the conclusion of Theorem 15 still holds when the payoff
stream ûk in Algorithm 2 is replaced by the perturbed process ũk = ûk + ξk .
Proof. Proof. Since the noise process ξ is bounded (a.s.), we can still assume that the perturbed payoff
functions are normalized in [0, 1]; hence, by taking a sufficiently small step sequence, Algorithm 2 re-
mains well-defined (i.e. X(n) ∈ X for all n). It thus suffices to check that the conditional expectation of the
innovation term of (38) with ûk replaced by ũk = ûk + ξk still yields the entropy-driven dynamics (EDθ ).
That this is so, is an immediate consequence of the independence between ξk and α̂k ; indeed:
E[ũk (n + 1) 1(α̂k (n + 1) = α)|Fn]
= E
[
(ûk (n + 1) + ξk (n + 1)) 1(α̂k (n + 1) = α)|Fn
]
= ukα(X(n)) + E
[
ξk (n + 1)|Fn
]
Xkα(n) = ukα(X(n)), (42)
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(d) Distribution after n = 10 iterations.
Figure 2: Snapshots of the evolution of of Algorithm 2. In our simulations, we drew 104 random initial strategies in the potential
game of Fig. 1 and, for each strategy allocation, we ran the Boltzmann variant of Algorithm 2 with learning temperature T = 0.2
and step sequence γn = 1/(5 + n0.6). In each figure, the shades of gray represent the normalized density of states at each point of
the game’s strategy space and we also drew the phase portraits of the underlying mean dynamics (ED) for convenience. We see that
Algorithm 2 converges to the game’s QRE (which, for T = 1/% = 0.2 are very close to the game’s strict equilibria) quite rapidly:
after only n = 10 iterations, more than 99% of the initial strategies have converged within ε = 0.01 of the game’s equilibria.
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where the second equality follows from the independence of ξ and α̂, and the last one stems from the fact
that ξ(n) is an Fn-adapted difference of martingale. The entropic dynamics (ED) are then obtained as in
(39). 
Remark 1. We should note here that the assumptions on the noise term ξ(n) of Proposition 16 are rather
mild: they encompass not only the case where the perturbations are independent of the players’ choices
(a case which has attracted significant interest in the literature by itself), but also scenarios where ξ(n+ 1)
might depend on the entire history of the game up to stage n, or even when the noise stems from imperfect
observations of the other players’ current actions (i.e. at the (n + 1)-th stage of the game).
Asynchronous updates and delays. In Algorithm 2, it is assumed that players update their strategies at
every iteration simultaneously, i.e. they adhere to a synchronous strategy revision process. On the other
hand, in congestion games and applications (e.g. in wireless networks), it is often the case that revisions
are asynchronous: for instance, if we consider a set of wireless users communicating with a slotted
ALOHA base station [1], then each user’s decision to transmit or remain silent at a given timeslot is not
coordinated with other users, so updates and strategy revisions occur at different periods for each user.
Furthermore, in the same scenario, variable message propagation delays often mean that the outcome of
a user’s choice does not depend on the choices of other users at the current timeslot, but on their choices
in previous timeslots.
In view of the above, the first extension to Algorithm 2 that we will consider here is the case where
only a random subset of players (possibly of cardinality 1) revises their strategies at a given iteration of
the algorithm. To that end, let Rn ⊆ 2N be the random set of players who update their strategies at the
n-th iteration of the algorithm. In practice, players are not aware of the global iteration counter n but can
only know the number of updates that they have carried out up to time n, as measured by the random
variables φk (n) ≡ card{m ≤ n : k ∈ Rm }, k ∈ N. Accordingly, the asynchronous variant of Algorithm
2 that we will consider consists of replacing the instruction “for each player k ∈ N” by “for each player
k ∈ Rn” and replacing “n” by “φk (n)” in the step-size computation.
Furthermore, as noted above, another natural extension of Algorithm 2 consists of allowing the (pos-
sibly perturbed) payoffs perceived by the players to be subject to delays. Formally, let τkα(n) be the
(integer-valued) delay that player k experiences when playing his α-th action at step n. Then, the payoff
ûk of player k in (38) at step n should be replaced by uk (αk (n);α−k (n − τkα(n))), with expected value
conditioned on the history Fn given by uk ,αk (n)(X(n − τkα(n))).
Following Chapter 7 of Borkar [8], we will make the following assumptions regarding these two
extensions of Algorithm 2:
1. The step sequence is of the form γn = K/n, where K is a positive constant small enough to
guarantee that Algorithm 2 remains well-defined for all n.
2. The strategy revision process Rn is a homogeneous ergodic Markov chain over 2N. We denote by




3. The delays τkα(n) are bounded, i.e. there exists M such that for every n, 0 ≤ τkα(n) ≤ M (a.s.).
This condition ensures that the bias induced by the delay becomes negligeable in face of the step-
size sequence as times goes by.
These hypotheses are rather mild in themselves, but they can be weakened even further at the expense of
presentational simplicity and clarity (see e.g. Chapter 7 of Borkar [8]). Still and all, in this context, we
have:
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Proposition 17. Under the previous assumptions, the conclusion of Theorem 15 still holds for the variant
of Algorithm 2 with asynchronous updates and payoff delays.
Proof. Proof. By Theorems 2 and 3 in Chapter 7 of Borkar [8], the algorithm modified to account for
asynchronous strategy revisions and payoff delays as above, will be a stochastic approximation of the
rate-adjusted dynamics
ẋk = λk EDθ (xk ), (43)
where λk is the mean rate at which player k updates its strategy, and EDθ denotes the RHS of the entropy-
driven dynamics (EDθ ). In general, the revision rate λ will depend on time (leading to a non-autonoumous
dynamical system), but given that the revision process Rn is a homogeneous ergodic Markov chain, λk
will be equal to the (constant) probability of including player k at the revision set Rn at the n-th iteration
of the algorithm. These dynamics have the same rest points as (ED) and an easy calculation shows that
the free entropy F(x) = Th(x) −U(x) of 6 remains a strict Lyapunov function for (43), so the proof of
Theorem 15 goes through unchanged. 
Remark 1. It is important to note here that the entropic dynamics (43) adjusted for different strategy
revision rates are equivalent to the choice-adjusted dynamics (EDλ ) which correspond to players using
a different inverse choice temperature (hence the identical notation). Therefore, if the players’ revision
process is a homogeneous ergodic Markov chain, their mean revision rates λk ∈ (0, 1) may also be viewed
as inverse choice temperatures of players who never miss a revision opportunity, but who tone down their
actions’ performance scores by playing the mixed strategy xk = Q(λk yk ) instead of Q(yk ).18
4.5 Algorithm 2 in practice.
Let us give a close look at Algorithm 2 to assess its interest from an engineering perspective.
• First, it should be clear that the algorithm is highly distributed. The information needed to update
one player’s strategy is the payoff of its chosen action, which does not depend on any assessment of
alternative choices. In particular, it does not rely on the observation of other players action, or even
on the knowledge of the set of other players. Another feature is the fact that no synchronization
between players is required: As shown in Section ??, each player can choose its updates instants in
a complete independent fashion.
• The algorithm is robust to imperfection in the measurement (if any) of the payoff. This measure-
ment can be based on old actions of remote players and it can suffer from random fluctuations (for
example coming from a bad instrument and/or perturbations from the environment).
• The temperature parameter T should be rather easy to tune: In potential games, it should be taken
strictly positive to ensure convergence to quantal response equilibria. Of course, small temperature
values give better approximation of NE because QRE gets closer and closer to Nash equilibria
when the temperature goes to 0. But, small temperatures may alter the speed of convergence
because the step-sizes have to be chosen very small.The optimal choice of the temperature giving
a good compromise between accuracy and speed of convergence is problem dependent.
All this leads to a distributed, player centric version of Algorithm 2, given in Algorithm 3, where each
player k is equipped with a clock and plays each time its clock rings. The clock rings (τkn)n∈N form an
infinite increasing sequence of integers with positive rate (i.e. for any n, n
τkn
> c ≥ 0). The corresponding
revision set at time n, Rn , is defined by: Rn = {k |n ∈ (τkn)n∈N}.
18Note also that λk < 1 so players who do not update all the time tend to choose actions in a more uniform manner.
RR n° 8210
Entropy-driven game dynamics 32





n ← n + 1
select a new action α̂k according to the mixed strategy Xk # current action
ûk ← uk (α̂1 , . . . , α̂N ) # compute (or measure) current payoff
foreach action α ∈ Ak do # update mixed strategy
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